In the night of August 18, 2010, the last
American combat unit that was still stationed in Iraq crossed the border of
Kuwait. Although former president Obama had announced an “accomplished mission”,
no particular ceremony was held to celebrate the success of the mission when
the American troops finally left the country of Iraq.
It is true that the
overall political assessment of this military mission, which is the most important
mission the Americans asserted since the war in Vietnam, remains rather
undefined. We are still far from attaining a “better peace”, the goal to every
war according to Liddell Hart.
A country facing
division
One of the main issues Iraq is dealing with is
the problematic democratic transfer of power to the Iraqi government. Not only
does this new Iraqi government maintain ties with Iran, in the near future it
will also encounter difficulties to keep the country together as division seems
more probable every day. Although Nouri Al-Maliki, who was elected in 2008,
seems to be a statesman, the political body of the country has not succeeded in
creating an actual state since the elections of 2005. Furthermore, since the
tensions that arose in 2006 and 2007 partisan and sectarian egotisms prevail
all over again.
Currently, at the very end of the legislature,
fundamental laws regarding the development of the country, the oil industry and
the status of political parties and regional governance are still on hold; as
well as the referendum on the future of the city of Kirkuk. Moreover, the
country of Iraq is rated 176th out of 180 countries regarding its political
integrity and the rivalry between political parties and ministers is very
similar to a struggle between predators. Due to the unprogressive political
system of Bagdad, a gap has occurred between the government and the rest of the
Iraqi society and the local administrations.
A symptom of this problem is the
degradation of the security situation since the departure of the American troops
in 2009. From August to December 2009, terrorist attacks increasingly occurred in
the city of Bagdad. Within four months, at least 400 people got killed, which
led to the postponement of the legislative elections from January to March
2010. And still, Bagdad stays one of the world’s most dangerous cities, and
throughout the country of Iraq, 15 to 20 people get killed daily. Djihadist
movements are still present, and their Sunnite adherence shows the
disappointment regarding the political popularity of the Sunnites and their
fear for marginalisation.
The cause but also the consequence of this
security situation is the fragmentation of the security forces, which is
increasingly visible in the allegiance to the government and has therefore
become a political issue. Maliki has the upper hand in the operational command
of Bagdad and the presidential brigade, whereas the 17th division command in
the south of the capital together with the 6th division in the airport and the
two Kurdish divisions (the 15th and the 16th command in the mountains) assure
the second security circle. Another event, which shows the government’s
increasing concern about its own security forces, is the arrest and quick
release of fifty government officials of the ministry of interior mid-December
2008 under the accusation of “Attempt to organize a coup against the
government”. It is true, that the Ministry of interior, comprises all the
so-called parallel forces of the other ministries (forces for oil protection,
electricity protection etc.), and has therefore become the first employer of
the country with a force of over a half a million men.
While facing this
governmental paralysis, several armed forces are on standby. The Sahwa
movement, of which the Maliki government has fired the militias, still exists
and retains the option to rise again through an armed confrontation. The same
goes for the Army of Mahdi, which is clearly waiting for the Americans to
leave. The green line that separates Kurdistan from Arab part of Iraq is over
armed, especially in the oil-rich region of Kirkuk. After the period of ethnic
cleansing by Saddam Hussein, the Kurds moved back to this region, impatiently
waiting for the referendum provided for by the constitution, which would enable
them to annex Kirkuk to the autonomous zone. Such a decision would immediately
marginalize the Sunnites, whose only source of oil revenue would disappear. It
would also cause concern in Turkey, who would be the least to be happy to see a
powerful and prosperous Kurdistan emerge at its borders.
The Americans are in a
very peculiar position regarding this situation. They are anxious to
maintain a Sunnite counterforce to a government that has close ties with
Teheran, but they also want to spare Turkey. They believe that a Kurdish annex of
Kirkuk would be too dangerous, what would mean that they alienate their true
ally in the region. Therefore, they support the enactment of a law for the
equal distribution of hydrocarbons. All local political actors however, have
declined this law. Kirkuk is of such strategic significance to both the Kurds
and the Arab Sunnites, that the situation in this area has been put on
ice/frozen before possibly becoming the epicentre of a civil war.
The moment of truth is
approaching. While Iraq is still on the front page of every American journal,
on the site the Americans troops fail to maintain their unity. The cornerstone
of Iraq’s security has disappeared as well as the major tool of the American
policy in the region. However, the capacity to act in response to local and
regional events shouldn’t be given up. Therefore the armed forces have
committed themselves to a new metamorphosis.
The local allied armies.
In Iraq, the Americans
maintain a strong relationship with the two major local armies: the autonomous
Kurdish army (counting almost 200.000 Peshmergas), and the Iraqi national army,
which is dependant of the Americans.
The Iraqi army is to a
large extent equipped with American materials, which generates immense revenues
(1,6 billions dollars for the 140 chars M1) and which makes it logistically
easier for the American to retreat ; as they can leave a great part of their
material to the Iraqis. The strengthening of the Iraqi army has become a
necessity because of the retreat of the American brigades, which delivered a
great part of the means for transport, logistics and support to the Iraqi.
Currently, the Iraqi army is nothing more than a collection of infantry
battalions. Its main points of weakness are its logistics and its maintenance;
therefore it requires permanent support of the Americans. Moreover, the Iraqi
army almost entirely lacks of air force, which means that every action taken
against a regular army will equally necessitate American aerial support.
The ongoing
transformation is about human. The Iraqi national army, which is counting
220.000 men, is dependant of 50.000 American soldiers who will only to stay
until the end of 2011. This time span and volume of force corresponds with the
plans the Americans made in 2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The volume
of the American forces, councillors, and especially the Special Forces that
will stay after the end of 2011 has not been determined yet. The number of
10.000 men has often been raised, keeping in mind that it is also possible to
use civil contractors. At the Pentagon, this kind of civil employees is already
more numerous than the number serviceman and it deployment of these contractors
would reduce the military visibility in the region.
We still need to
determine who will be commanding this American-Iraqi army. It’s appointed chief
of staff himself, general Zebari has openly declared his preference for a
long-term American presence in Iraq (at least until 2020). This will secure the
respect among the Iraqi population towards the army in general and the way in
which it provides security. This growing popularity however, makes the army
more threatening in regard to the weak government. Regarding the fact that
modern Iraq went through seven “coups d’état”, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the Americans will use this asset in times of chaos like we
saw in 2006, or alignment with Iran. Furthermore, the construction of army
bases in the cities of Bassorah, Mossoul, Kirkuk and Erbil, shows the will to
rapidly reimplant terrestrial combat units.
The regional device
‘Central Command’, the
American military device in the region, remains strong and is even growing.
First of all it supports a number of military bases along the Arabic Gulf, from
camp Arifjan in Kuwait (which hosts more than 15.000 men), the smaller air
bases of Msirah and Thumrait in the Sultanate of Oman to the large bases in
Bahrain (Manama, for the 5th fleet) and Qatar (Airforce and logistics). The
costs to enlarge the bases in Bahrain and Qatar are already exceeding 1,5
billion dollars. The United States’ 5th fleet maintains at least one naval air
force group as well and an amphibious one. In the second sphere of this device,
the Americans profit from the bases of Diego Suarez, throughout the Indian
Ocean, in Djibouti and Incirlik and in Turkey.
Although the terrestrial forces of the Americans may have become
limited, the aerial strike capacity remains considerable.
The second part of this
device is the Saudi ally, who has been delivering equipment to the Americans
since the ’60-ies. Over the next twenty years, Saudi Arabia will profit from
the delivery of another 63 billion dollars worth of equipment. This is probably
the reason why the United States wants to make their Saudi ally the next rampart
against Iran and Iraq.
The third part of this
device is the integration of two local forces into two networks. The first
network’s main goal is the fight against terrorism while mainly focusing on
Jordan. A Special Operations training centre has been set up in order to fight
terrorism throughout the whole region. Jordan is the general training and
education base for the Arab allies of the United States, for which the country
receives 700 million dollars annually.
The second network is an
anti-missile defence project based on the only X-band radar, which is installed
in the Neguev desert in Israel. The Obama administration is lobbying for the
development of another radar in one of the Gulf states. These two X-band
radars, which would be connected to the anti-missiles defence systems Patriot
and THAAD (delivered to the monarchies of the Gulf) and the AEGIS radars of the
5th fleet, would enable the Americans to set up a strong anti-missile defence
network in order to face a possible ballistic and nuclear attack from the
Iranians. This network would be integrated in the European anti-missile defence
system, which is currently under construction.
At the same time the
Iranian threat is being used to force indirect cooperation between the Gulf
states, Israel and NATO under an American umbrella. However, on the other hand
this anti-missile defence cooperation could be seen as the acceptation of the
nuclearisation of Iran. Teheran could also see it as an alternative to coercive
action against Iran or to the nuclearisation of Saudi Arabia as a whole.
Behind this network
there is the temptation to create a new CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), which
associates Iraq, the Gulf states and the Middle-East and maybe Turkey in order
to be able to create it during the Middle-Eastern meeting of NATO.
The renewal of asymmetry
Prima facie,
the retreat of the American terrestrial forces from Iraq doesn’t seem to affect
the general military capacities of the United States in the region as a whole.
We could say that these have even increased after the recovery of fifteen to
twenty combat brigades from the Iraqi mud. Furthermore, we could also assume
that the investments made in infrastructure in the Gulf states have also been
beneficiary to the American military effectiveness in the region. However, in
reality these capacities have depleted. The retreat of the American forces from
Iraq has coincided with the strengthening of the troops that are deployed in
Afghanistan. Moreover, the consented efforts that have been made in the wars
against non-state organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have considerably
diminished the physical and the moral capacities of the American forces in the
medium term (46.000 American soldiers got killed or hurt, 1.000 billion dollars
were spent). The capacity of the
American troops in the Middle-East exist thus almost exclusively out of strike and
counter-strike capabilities.
However, the campaign of
Israel against Hezbollah in 2006 shows that these means are little adapted to
possible enemies such as non-state actors that are embedded in the
Middle-Eastern society. The threat of Al-Qaeda may have diminished; it still
exists and is maintained in the outskirts of the Arabic world (Somalia and
Yemen). The massive terrorist attacks in Iraq are the evidence of the fact that
Al-Qaeda (Islamic State in Iraq) could re-emerge whenever it would like to. The
lesson learned from the “war on terror” is that the main enemy of Al-Qaeda
aren’t the American but, in fact, the Arabs themselves.
The second threat, which
might even be more important right now, is Iran and its allied organizations
such as Hezbollah, Hamas and although less important, the army of Mahdi in
Iraq. Iran is developing a system similar to that of Hezbollah but on a bigger
scale and endowed with a high capacity anti-aerial system. From a military
point of view, this defence system as a whole can be considered as very
effective but with limited offensive capabilities, especially after the setting
up of a regional system of anti-missile and anti-rocket defence in Israel.
Today we stand with two
military tools; on one hand there is Iran with its allies, and on the other
hand the US and its allies, both cancelling each other out and incapable to
defeat the other. All this indicates the set up of a new cold war in the
Middle-East in the years to come, with China as a disturbing force as its
interests in the region are increasing.
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